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GEORGE R. ROMNEY and M.
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MAURICE ROMNEY COMPANY, a partnership et al,
Defendants~ Third-Party Plaintiffs~
and Appellants~

Case No.
10143

vs.

INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY
COl\'IPANY, a corporation,
Third Party Defendant and
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Shirley P. Jones Jr., Esquire
411 American Oil Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ITT i\ II STATE BUILDING
IHL\RD, et al,
Plaintiffs~

vs.
GEOH(~E

R. ROMNEY and M.
\VALLIS ROMNEY, dba G.
l\IAlTHICE ROMNEY COlVIPAN-Y, a partnership et al,
IJefcndants, Third-Party Plaintiffs~
and

Case No.
10143

Appellants~

vs.
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY
COl\IP .ANY, a corpocation,
Third Party Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE)IEXT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a case involving the construction of the
terms of a priYate bonding contract between Appellants
and Respondent. It does not involve a statutory bond
3
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or a public bond, but simply the construction of a private agreement made at arm's length for sufficient
consideration between Appellants' subcontractor and
Respondent bonding company.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court at pretrial correctly ruled that
Appellants' third party complaint should be dismissed
with prejudice and upon the merits and the court further
correctly determined that Appellants-the prime contractor, and its statutory bonding company, American
Casualty Company-had no cause of action against
Respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to affirm the judgment of the
lower court and also for a ruling of this court that Appellants' appeal was not timely filed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July, 1959, defendants and appellants, Romney
Company, entered into a contract as prime contractor
with the Utah State Building Board for the construction of a rehabilitation center in the University of Utah
Medical Center. Defendant, American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, furnished the statutory
performance and payment bond for the prime contractor, Romney Company, in connection with the job.
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Defendant, \Valsh Plumbing Company, entered into
a subcontract with the prime contractor, Romney Company, to perform the plumbing portion of the prime
contract. Homney Coznpany required and obtained from
third party defendant and respondent, Industrial Indemnity Company, a private, as distinct from public
or statutory, subcontractor's bond (pretrial Exhibit
1) and the judgment (R. 225) of the Court below
with respect to this bond is the subject matter of this
appeal.
The -,action was commenced by various laborers,
materialmen and suppliers alleging non-payment on
the job. Defendant, Romney Company and American
Casualty Company, answered and filed their third
party complaint ( R. 6) alleging that third party defendant, Industrial Indemnity Com:(>any, was liable
for the payment of plaintiff's claims on account of the
subcontractor's bond which it wrote for Walsh Plumbing Company. This bond (Pretrial Exhibit 1) provided
that Industrial Indemnity Company, as surety, and
Walsh Plumbing Company as principal
"are held and firmly bound unto G. Maurice
Romney Company as obligee, hereinafter called
owner, for the use and benefit of claimants as
hereinbelow defined* **to remain in full force
and effect subject, however, to the following
conditions * * *
3. No suit or action shall be commenced hereunder by any claimant.
(a) Unless claimant shall have given written
notice to any two of the following: The Princi5
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pal, the Owner, or the Surety above named,
within ninety {90) days after such claimant did
or performed the last of the work or labor, or
furnished the last of the materials for which said
claim is made, stating with substantial accuracy
the amount claimed and the name of the party
to whom the materials were furnished, or for
whom the work or labor was done or performed.
Such notice shall he served by mailing the same
by registered mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed to the Principal, Owner or
Surety, at any place where an office is regularly
maintained for the transaction of business, or
served in any manner in which legal process may
he served in the state in which the aforesaid
project is located, save that such service need not
he made by a public officer."
It was established from the interrogatories of third
party defendant and respondent to all plaintiffs and
claimants, and the admissions of the parties at pre-trial,
that no claimant had complied with the written notice
requirements of respondent's bond.
At the pre-trial hearing held on February 21, 1964,
the following facts were established by the pleadings,
admissions of the parties, and statements of counsel
to the pre-trial Judge. (These facts were set forth in
the Pre-trial Order (R. 225) numbered in said order as
follows.)
3. J. G. Wedding did business prior to October 1,
1961, as Walsh Plumbing Company.

4. On or about October 1, 1961, J. G. Wedding

sold the Walsh Plumbing Company to Sylvia Rhode,
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who itninediately thereafter incorporated the same as
\Valsh Plumbing Company, a Nevada corporation.
5. Pretrial Exhibit 1 is a bond furnished by In-

dustrial Indemnity Company as surety and J. G. Wedding as principal to the G. Maurice Romney Company,
partnership.
8. The parties agree that no one gave any notice to

the Industrial Indemnity Company or to Walsh Plumbing Company or to Romney Company as required in
Paragraph 3a on page 2 of the Industrial Indemnity
Company bond.
9. The Industrial Indemnity Company claims that
the bond was not made for the benefit of the Romney
Company but was made for the benefit of materialmen,
and since no materialmen have given notice as prescribed by Paragraph 3a of the Industrial Indemnity
bond, the court will hold as a matter of law that Romney
Company cannot recover under Pretrial Exhibit 1.
10. On or about October 1, 1961, the principal was
changed from J. G. Wedding, doing business as Walsh
Plumbing Company, to the Walsh Plumbing Company,
a corporation, but no novation or agreement between
the parties or any of them was ever made to the effect
that J. G. 'Vedding was relieved from his contract to
perfonn as made with Romney Company.
17. It is ordered that the action insofar as the
Industrial Indemnity Company, a corporation, is concerned be dismissed with prejudice.

7
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The Court signed this Order on February 24, 1964,
and the Order was filed and entered upon the direction
of the Court, on February 25, 1964. The Order shows
that a copy was mailed to all attorneys appearing at
the pre-trial.
On March 30, 1964, after the time for appeal had
elapsed, defendant and appellant served a Motion to
Amend the Pre-Trial Order ( R. 229) and this Motion
was filed April 2, 1964, and also on April 2, 1964, the
Court entered its Order denying the Motion (R. 236)
for no good cause$)lown and for not being timely made.
A contention was made by defendants and appellants
that the pre-trial judgment and order was governed by
Rule 54 (b) U.R.C.P., therefore, in order to clarify
his intentions with respect to the pre-trial judgment,
the Judge on April2, 1964, made and entered the nunc
pro tunc judgment complained of by appellants (R.
233). All the Court did in this judgment was to recite
that it appeared to him at the time of pre-trial that
there was no just reason for delay and also to expressly
direct the entry of judgment, which judgment, as a
matter of fact, had already been actually entered by
the Court itself on February 25, 1964.
On April 8, 1964, defendant and appellant filed
their motion to set aside the nunc pro judgment (R.
252) and this motion was denied by the Court on April
30, 1964. (See Stipulation of the parties, R. 254).
Appellants have not appealed from this Order denying
their motion to set aside the nunc pro tunc judgment.

8
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ARGlTl\lENT
POINT I.

THE NOTIC~~ PROVISIONS OF RESPONDENT'S BOND ARE REASONABLE AND APPELL.ANT IS BOUND BY THE TERMS OF
THE BOND AND IS NOT ENTITLED TO
IMPLY OR READ INTO THE BOND TERMS
\VHICH ARE NOT THERE.
Most of Appellants' brief under its Points A ( 1)
(2), is devoted to a strange and somewhat speciou~
argument to the effect that in some way Appellanh
were entitled to sue Respondent bonding company for
the "use and benefit" of themselves rather than for the
"use and benefit of claimants" as provided in the obligation of the bond.
Appellant, Romney Company was the prime contractor on this job; Appellant, American Casualty
Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, furnished the required statutory bond. Apparently, Appellants desired additional bonding with respect to the subcontractor. J. G. 'Vedding, dba Walsh Plumbing Company.
Accordingly, Appellant, Romney Company required
its subcontractor to enter into a contractual bonding
agreement with Respondent Industrial Indemnity Company. This contract was a Labor and Material Payment
Bond. which bond contract is identified in this record
as pretrial Exhibit No. 1. In this agreement, Respondent. Industrial Indemnity Company agreed as follows:

9
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1. To be "firmly bound unto Romney Company as

obligee, hereinafter called owner~ for the use and benefit
of claimants as herein below defined/~
2. To "remain in full force and effect, subject,
however, to the following conditions." These conditions
are set forth in Paragraph 3 and 3 (a). They, in effect,
provide that the owner shall have no rights for the use
and benefit of claimants unless claimants have given the
required notice as set forth in Paragraph 3 (a) of the
bond. The plain, ordinary, clearly expressed intent of
this bond is that the surety will pay the claims of claimants provided that it be given the requisite notice. This
is perfectly valid, and, in fact, usual, subcontract bond
condition. Appleman Insurance Law and Practice,
Volume 10, Section 6241, states the principle involved
as follows:

"A notice of default provision under a contractor's bond is a valid and enforceable condition precedent to liability of the surety. Failure
to comply by giving proper notice to the surety
would relieve it of liability" (Citing cases) .
The principle is also stated in 50 American Jurisprudence, Section 42, at Page 934, as follows:
"It is frequently a requirement of fidelity
bonds and contractor's bonds that notice of default be given to the insured or surety and if the
requirement is reasonable, there must be a compliance therewith in order to hold the surety
liable."
10
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.Appellants in their brief, cite the Utah case, Carporation of Preside·nt of LDS vs. Hartford, 98 U. 297,
{);) P. 2rl 736, as supporting their position, but, actually,
a fair reading of the holding of the case indicates that
the case supports the position of Respondent because
the court states that "sureties in building contracts are
not entitled to any notice of default unless the agreement expressly provides therefor". Here, the bond in
question does expressly provide for notice. It is uncontroverted that the notice was not given and, therefore, the trial court's construction of the bond was
correct.
Appellants simply state, without any justification
therefor in the language of 'the bonding contract, that
what the bond in effect says, is that if claimants fail to
give notice as required, then this bond is not for the
use and benefit of claimants as it says, but is for the
benefit of the obligee and its statutory surety and will
permit a suit by them for money owed claimants. It
would seem on the face of it that this argument is unsound. If Appellants had wanted a bond which gave
them a right to sue in case claimants did not pursue their
remedies under the subcontractor's bond, then it would
have been a perfectly simple matter for Appellants
to require Respondent bonding company to agree to
such a right of action in the prime contractor. There
is no such provision in the. instant bond. It is simply
a bond for the protection and payment of claimants
for proper claims provided reasonable notice is given as
provided in Paragraph 3 (a) of the bond.

11
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Appellants state in their brief on Page 8, that
Romney, the ~rime contractor, required Walsh Plumbing, the subcontractor, to furnish a bond "for the satisfactory performance of this agreement" and cite as
authority for this statement Exhibit D-16 and "2nd"
page of Pretrial Exhibit 1. At the time of the pretrial
there was no Exhibit D-16 before the court and there
never was any "2nd" page of Pretrial Exhibit 1. This
"2nd" page was attached to Pretrial Ex. 1 sometime
after the record was filed in this court. These alleged
exhibits were not offered by Appellants at pretrial,
were not before the trial court, and reference to them
on this appeal is improper and they are in no way
binding upon Respondent. Pretrial Exhibit 1 was and
is the bond in question, consisting of one page. It was
offered into evidence at the pretrial by Respondent.
There was no 2nd page attached to it at that time and
Appellants have no right in this appeal to quote this
alleged 2nd page obtained from sources unknown to
Respondent. In any event, it is not material in this
appeal what Appellant Romney may or may not have
required of the subcontractor in its subcontract. The
fact remains that if Appellant, Romney, did not like
the subcontract bond submitted, it was at perfect liberty
to refuse the same and obtain one containing terms
more to its liking, particularly in view of the position
Appellants take in this appeal urging the proposition
that they are entitled to read terms into the bond which
are not there. A reading of the cases cited by Appellants
shows that not one of them supports the construction

12'
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of the bond urged by Appellants in this appeal. Ob-

viously ,the obligee is a party to the bonding contract
and. obviously, he is entitled to have the ter~ns of the
contraet perfortned. No one disputes this proposition,
but he is not entitled to turn a simple, ordinary provision, guaranteeing payments to claimants if their
claims are properly presented, into a construction that
said obligee can recover the amounts claimed by claimants whether the conditions of the bond are met or not.
\Vhat this case really represents is an attempt by the
prime contractor and its bonding company, American
Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania, to force
a subcontract bond to pay the obligation for which
American Casualty is primarily liable under the statute
and under its bond.

POINT II
IN ANY EVENT, RESPONDENT WAS
CO:\IPLETEL Y DISCHARGED FROM THE
OBLIGATION OF ITS BOND BECAUSE OF
A ~IA TERIAL ALTERATION.
The pretrial Judge's order of dismissal with prejudice was not based solely on the proposition that the
notice provision of the Respondent's bond had not been
complied with. Paragraph 10 of said Pretrial Order
(R. 226) explains what happened in this case. On or
about October 1, 1961, which was prior to the time of
any default by the subcontractor, the Principal in the
bond (Pretrial Exhibit 1) was changed. Respondent
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wrote this bond for J. G. Wedding, doing business as
Walsh Plumbing Company. In October, 1961, J. G.
Wedding, dba Walsh Plumbing Company, sold the
business to one Sylvia Rhode, who thereafter incorporated the business as Walsh Plumbing Company, a
Nevada corporation. (Paragraph 4 of the Pretrial Order, R. 226). As is stated in Volume 50, American Jurisprudence, Section 48, at Page 937:
"A surety obligation is a contractual one, and
like other contractual obligations may not be
altered without the consent of the surety who
has assumed the obligation."
And, further, Section 50, Page 939, this:
"The variations or changes in the suretyship
contract which, if made without the surety's consent, will discharge him are very often characterized by the courts as 'material' alterations, although it is said in some cases that the surety is
discharged whether the alterations are material
or not."
The authorities hold without dissent that a change
of Principal is a material change in the obligation which
will discharge the surety from liability. Spokane Union
Stockyards Co. vs. Maryland Casualty Co._, 105 Wash.
306; 178 P. 3; 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 130, Page 990; 144
A.L.R. 1267. Respondent bonding company in this case
was called upon by Appellants by virtue of their third
party complaint to pay the debts of a new and substituted Principal. Appellants did not and cannot show
that any notice of this change of Principal was given to
Respondent.

14
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POINT III.
ACTC1\.L NOTICE I~ LIEU OF \VRITTEN
XO'fll'E IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
Appellants in their brief at Point I (B), Page 15,
attempt to raise an issue of actual notice. This point
should not be considered by this court for the following
reason. On March 30, 1964, Appellants filed and served
u ~lotion to Atnend the Pretrial Order (R. 229) contending that "actual notice was given sufficient to
comply with Paragraph 3 (a)". On April 2, 1964, (R.
:!:W) this Motion was denied by an Order of the trial
court. Appellants have never appealed from this Order.
Therefore, this issue has been finally disposed of, and
is moot.

POINT IV.
THE PRETRIAL ORDER ENTERED FEB25, 196~, (R. 225), WAS A FINAL AND
APPEALABLE ORDER AND NO TIMELY
.APPEAL THEREFROM WAS MADE BY APPELLANTS.
RU.AR\~

The Pretrial Order dismisses the action completely
as far as Respondent, Industrial Indemnity Company,
was concerned. The dismissal was with prejudice. All
claims of all parties against Industrial Indemnity Company were disposed of by this Order. It was not the
kind of situation contemplated by Rule 54 (b) when
part of the claims against a party are settled and some
15
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remaining claims are left to be disposed of. In many
cases, this Court has considered what the essentials of
a final judgment are in order to determine whether or
not a given judgment is appealable. The Court has
held that any judgment, terminating litigation between
parties in the court rendering it, is final. Bear River
Valley Orchard Co. vs.Hanley~ 15 U. 506, 50 P. 611;
Stoll vs. Da)y Min. Co~~ 19 u·. 271, 57 P. 295.
Where the rights of the parties in an action are
determined by the court and nothing is reserved for
future determination, the judgment with respect thereto
is final. State vs. Booth~ 21 U. 88, 59 P. 553.
The test of finality for purpose of appeal is not
necessarily whether the whole matter involved in the
action is concluded, but rather whether the particular
proceeding with respect to the party involved is terminated by the judgment. Winnovich vs. Emery~ 33 U.
345, 93 P. 988; Bristol vs. Brent~ 35 U. 213, 99 P. 1000.
It is quite common under our practice for the pretrial Judge to make a final determination based upon
the pleadings and the statements of counsel at the hearing. Sometimes the order entered is in the nature of a
summary judgment and sometimes the order disposing
of the case is just simply an order based upon the pretrial hearing. In the following cases the court's disposition and judgment at pretrial hearing has been recognized as a final judgment. R. J. Duam Construction
Company vs. Child~ 247 P. 2d 817, 122 U. 194; Ulibarri
vs. Christenson~ 275 P. 2d 170, 2 U. 2d 367.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent's bonding contract is clear and unatnbiguous ..Appellants have no right under the agreement to ignore the notice provisions and sue in their
own name. The notice provisions are reasonable and were
not cmnplied with. The Principal was changed and a
new Principal substituted in this contract without the
consent of Respondent. Finally, the pretrial conference and judgment finally disposed of all claims against
third party defendant and Respondent, Industrial Indemnity Company. It was a final Order. The Order
itself recited that the dismissal was with prejudice. Said
Order was promptly mailed to Appellants. No one
could have been misled with respect to the Court's intention to make it a final Order.
Appellants have shown no reason in this case why
they should be permitted to avoid their obligations as
the prime contractor and the statutory bonding company and pass the burden of payment on to the subcontractor's bond, contrary to any provision therein or
any reasonable and just construction of said bond.
Respectfully submitted,
Shirley P. Jones, Jr.
Attorney for Respondent
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